Making the Fiscal Contract Work:
The Politics of Tax Evasion and Redistribution in Advanced Economies
Does tax noncompliance influence taxation politics?
When do tax evasion and avoidance by the rich dampen or enflame demand for redistribution?
How do elected officials deal with tax noncompliance when building coalitions around tax reform?
In recent years, these questions have gained new relevance. Scandals such as the Panama and Paradise Papers have attracted substantial public attention to evasion and avoidance by the rich. At the same time, scientific studies have verified that unequal access to noncompliance is common across advanced economies. In my manuscript project, I analyze the politics of noncompliance from both the demand and the supply side of tax policy.
Who said what?
FDR, Message to Congress,1937
[The] efforts at avoidance and evasion of tax
liability [are] so widespread and so amazing both
in their boldness and their ingenuity, that further
action without delay seems imperative.
[The tax system is] unfair, cluttered with
gobbledygook and loopholes designed for those
with the power and influence to hire high-priced
legal and tax advisers.
and why?
Reagan, Radio Speech,1985