BOOK PROJECT

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Breaking the Fiscal Contract: Why Governments Reduce Enforcement and Allow Tax Noncompliance

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PUBLICATIONS

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Filling the Tax Gap: How Private Donations Compensate A Faltering Fiscal Contract

Conditionally Accepted at American Journal of Political Science

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Tax Thy Neighbor: How Italian Mayors Increase Taxation in their Hometowns

RR at Comparative Political Studies

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Applications of GPT in Political Science Research

with Kyuwon Lee, Jeongmin Park, Hye Young You, and Sylvan Zheng

Forthcoming at PS: Political Science

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Status-Seeking and Nation-Building: The “Piedmont Principle” Revisited
2020, Journal of Interdisciplinary History

with Nicholas Sambanis and William C. Wohlforth

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WORKING PAPERS​

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Transitional Justice and Taxation in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina

with Monika Nalepa (University of Chicago)

UNU-Wider Working Paper​​​​

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What Women Need: The Public Policy Effects of Patriarchy

under review with Beatrice Montano (Columbia University) and Chiara Superti (Columbia University)

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What Men Need: Women Empowerment and Male Incentive Structure

with Beatrice Montano (Columbia University) and Chiara Superti (Columbia University)

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Is Academic Research Safe in the AI Revolution? Evaluating LLMs with Bayesian Process Tracing

​Under review

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SELECTED WORK IN PROGRESS

 

Taxation at the Edge of Morality: A Statewide RCT on California Tobacco Excise Enforcement

with Julian Gerez (UC Irvine)​

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To Privatize or to Centralize? An Empirical Analysis of Subnational Tax Collection Strategies

with Silvia Vannutelli (Northwestern University)

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Global Government GenAI Observatory (G3O): A Database of AI Adoption by 700,000 Public Institutions

with Nathan Feldman (University of Rochester) and Lowry Pressly (Stanford University)

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Rules Matter: How Tax Enforcement Increases Revealed Preference for Redistribution

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For Whom the Bell Tolled: Political Engagement, Taxes, and Welfare in Post-WWI Italy

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(A)Voiding the Fiscal Contract: How Tax Noncompliance by the Rich Constrains Redistribution